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Controlling the access to secure government facilities has become increasingly
important as these systems are entrusted with more sensitive applications.
Unauthorized access could be very detrimental to our nation's security. The use of
biometric measures, one of which is hand geometry, may represent a possible solution.
This thesis looks at one hand geometry identification device, and determines its
effectiveness as a function of the rejection threshold setting, a time lapse in use, and
the construction of the reference templates. Rejection thresholds of 40, 60, 80, 100,
120, and 140; three weeks of inactivity by the test subjects; and construction of the
reference templates from 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 individual hand readings were
examined. The application of hand geometry identification technology for protecting
Command, Control, and Communications (C3) facilities was then discussed. This
study used the ID-3D Hand Geometry Identifier built by Recognition Systems, Inc. of
San Jose, California. This device was very effective in producing low Type I and Type
II error rates during 6300 trials covering all situations examined. This technology has
great potential for protecting C3 facilities and systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Controlling the access to government owned and operated facilities has become
increasingly important as these systems are entrusted with more sensitive applications
and information. In fact, the subject of personal access to Command, Control, and
Communications (C3) systems is of the greatest national interest (FIBS Pub 48, 1977),
and it is essential that the Department of Defense protect its information processing
systems against unauthorized access as required by national security considerations
(DOD 5200.1, 1984). Greater effectiveness in access control is a necessity in today's
C3 world of sensitive information and protected systems.
There are three methods of verifying a persons identity in order to establish
access control procedures (FIBS Pub 83, 1980). These methods are:
1) Something a person knows
2) Something a person possesses
3) Something about a person.
The first method includes such things as passwords and lock combinations. The
second includes badges, passes, keys, and cards with machine-readable information.
The third category7 includes physiological attributes such as a persons weight, voice,
blood vessel pattern, hand geometry, etc.
Verification of identity through information known only to a person is a common
method of controlling access to time-shared systems. Of course, anything known by
one person may become known by another. This often happens because items like
passwords and lock combinations are selected which are related to a person's interests
or surroundings, or are written down to prevent them from being forgotten. It is then
easy for an imposter to obtain this known information and to successfully gain
unauthorized access. Locks, keys, badges, and card-keys are familiar mechanisms used
to control access to secure facilities. However, the degree of. security afforded by these
items is also limited because they too can be stolen or lost, and then easily used to gain
unauthorized access. What may be worse is that these items may fall into the hands of
an unauthorized user, duplicated, and returned. Unauthorized access could then be
gained without anyone even realizing it was taking place. Because of these
vulnerabilities in the first two methods of providing access control, much emphasis has
recently been focused on the technology of personal identification through
physiological attributes (Riganati, 1985). This area of study is called Biometrics, and is
defined as the use of unique personal characteristics to identify an individual. Through
the use of biometric devices, a person can be identified by virtue of what he is, rather
than through items he possesses or knows (Bakke, 1986). This third method of identity
verification can significantly increase the effectiveness of access control.
A number of personal attributes have been considered in developing biometric
access control devices. These include fingerprints, retinal blood vessel patterns, voice
prints, and signature dynamics (Government Computer News, 1985). Other
characteristics also considered are lip grooves, bite patterns, ear structures, and
electrocardiograms (Forsen, Nelson, Staron, 1977). Hand geometry is another type of
biometric identification. It uses a three dimensional image of the hand to uniquely
verify a persons identity. Hand geometry has been selected as a usable attribute for
biometric access control because the hand "is sufficiently rich in detail to meet even the
most stringent error specifications" (Forsen, Nelson, Staron, 1977, p. 2-13).
The ID-3D Hand Geometry Identifier by Recognition Systems, Inc of San Jose,
California is one such hand geometry identification verification device. It is the basis
of this thesis. The ID-3D Identifier verifies identification by comparing identity
discriminating characteristics of an individual hand picture to a reference template
made from a number of previously taken hand pictures of the same person. How close
the individual hand picture must be to the template in order to verify identification is
controlled by a threshold setting. For this study, an experiment was conducted to
determine the reliability of the ID-3D Hand Geometry Identifier as a function of the
threshold setting, the number of hand pictures used to make the reference template,
and a three week time lapse during which the test subjects did not use the device. This
thesis will describe the experiment, present the results, and discuss the applicability of
using the ID-3D Identifier to control access to C3 systems.
II. THE EXPERIMENT
The ID-3D Hand Geometry Identifier is a biometric recognition access device
which uses a three dimensional image of the hand to uniquely verify a persons identity.
The device operates by storing reference information of the hand's geometry in a
microprocessor, and, upon entry demand, compares the stored information with the
hand pattern of the individual seeking access. If the stored information and that
presented by the individual agrees within a threshold limit, access is allowed. If the
data does not compare within the limit, access is denied. (Users Manual. 19S6)
A. THE EQUIPMENT
The ID-3D Identifier can operate in a stand-alone mode, in a hybrid mode, or in
an integrated system mode (Sidlauskas. Oct 19S6). It can also be configured in a Test
System, and was set up as such for this experiment. The Test System consists of a
hand reader, a 12 digit keypad, and an IBM XT personal computer. The hand reader
and keypad were mounted in one housing as shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 ID-3D Hand Geometry Identity Verifier.
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The hand reader contains 256 Kbytes of random-access memory for hand
geometry data storage, 32 Kbytes of program memory, and two full duplex serial
communication ports for communication with host systems and local peripherals such
as a printer or terminals for user enrollment. The 12 button keypad is connected to the
hand reader, and is used to enter the users personal identification number (PIN).
The IBM XT computer portion of the Test System was used for system control,
monitoring, and data storage. It was connected to the hand reader, a keyboard, and a
video display unit, and contained a 20 Mbyte capacity hard disk for storage of over
10,000 hand images. In the experiment, the computer was used to enroll new users, set
system operating thresholds, and record all hand reader activity and operators
comments.
To operate the hand reader, the user enters his PIN via the keypad, and places
his hand on the measuring platen (Figure 2.1). Eight Kbyte digital pictures are then
acquired by the hand reader camera as in Figure 2.2. The camera consists of a light
source which illuminates the hand, and a lens which focuses a three dimensional image
of the hand on a silicone image detection chip. The chip is a square array of 256 by
256 individual picture element photo detectors. This chip changes the focused image
into a 8 Kbyte digit stream.
The analysis of the hand picture by the hand reader is functionally depicted in
Figure 2.3. The 8 Kbyte digital pictures are continually acquired until the hand
position detector determines the hand is properly positioned. Once positioned, a single
8 Kbyte picture is captured for dimensional analysis. This analysis consists of
measuring the physical dimensions of the hand. It considers the location of finger tips,
the location of the webs between the fingers, the widths and lengths of the fingers, the
total hand area, the thickness of the palm. etc. This dimensional analysis, a physical
measuring of the hand, produces a 96 Byte dimension vector. This vector is the
collection or aggregate of the 48 physical characteristics measured in the dimensional
analysis. Each measurement requires 2 Bytes, so 96 Bytes are needed for this vector.
The dimension vector then undergoes feature extraction. This consists of transforming
the dimension vector by using the data stored in the calibration matrices. These
matrices are tables of numbers which depict the relationships between characteristics of
universal hands. The matrices are used to eliminate those features in the dimension
vector which are common to all hands, and to retain those features which are unique







Figure 2.2 ID-3D Picture Acquisition.
longer represents the actual 48 physical characteristics measured, but is a
representation of the features which make the individual hand unique. These
operations of dimension analysis and feature extraction are accomplished to reduce the
amount of data, and at the same time retain all of the identification features of the
hand. During user enrollment, five of these feature vectors are mathematically
averaged, and the average is stored as the reference template vector of the enrollee.
During verification attempts, the feature vector produced is compared to the previously
saved reference template vector. A verification decision is then made based on the
magnitude of the difference between the feature vector and the template vector. The
difference between these two vectors is reduced to a single number which can range
from to 400. It is this difference score which is compared to a preset threshold
difference setting to determine successful identity verification.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE EXPERIMENT
There are two types of errors that can be made during access control efforts
(FIBS Pub 83, 1980). They are:
1) Type I Errors - Falsely rejecting an authorized user.

























Figure 2.3 ID-3D Functional Block Diagram.
Both of these types of errors must he considered in evaluating hand geometry biometric
access devices. These errors occur because of the difficulty in performing precise and
repeatable measurements of the human hand. An optimal biometric device can
correctly distinguish between the interpersonal variations in large groups of people, and
eliminate the effects of intrapersonal variations of a single individual (FIBS Pub 48,
1977). However, any access control device which is not perfect must deal with the
problems of both Type I and Type II errors.
The objective of this experiment was to determine the Type I and Type II error
rates of the ID-3D Hand Geometry identity verifier in various configurations and
situations. The first variable considered was that of different threshold settings. These
settings control how close an individual hand picture must be to the reference template
in order to grant access. Threshold differences of 40, 60, 80. 100, 120, and 140 were
used. The second variable was the number of hand pictures that were averaged to
make the reference template. Templates made from 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 individual
pictures were used. These templates, once constructed from a specific number of hand
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readings, were not updated or changed during the experiment. The third variable
considered was that of a time lapse between periods of use by the test subjects. After
being enrolled and using the ID-3D for three weeks, a three week, break was built into
the experiment. Test subjects then resumed use for two additional weeks. These
variables of threshold setting, reference template construction, and a time lapse in use
were used to determine the Type I and Type II error rates of the ID-3D Identifier.
These error rates determine the reliability of the ID-3D Identifier. If this device is
reliable in terms of denying access to imposters, and granting access to authorized
users, recommendations can be made as to the suitability of using this device in
controlling access to C3 systems.
C. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
1. Participants
One hundred and eight subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects
were between the ages of 25 and 38, and were students at the Naval Postgraduate
School taking either the Man-Machine Interaction or Human Factors System Design
course. There was one civilian participant, and all other 107 were military officers.
There were 10 international officers, and 97 US military officers. Ten of the
participants were women. A majority of the participants were technically oriented, and
all were cooperative, and curious about the ID-3D Identifier. There were no incentives
to succeed at the verification attempts, such as the granting of access to a place of
employment, as would be typical in an operational access control situation. The device
was set up in a laboratory, and available to the subjects during the school day. The
subjects were totally unsupervised while accomplishing their verification attempts.
None of the subjects were familiar with the ID-3D Identifier as none of them had used
it or any other hand geometry verification device prior to the experiment.
2. Enrollment Process
The first step in the experiment was the enrollment process. This process is
the procedure by which each subject's hand geometry is converted into a reference
template and stored in the hand reader's memory. This is the reference template
against which all other hand pictures are compared when access is attempted.
To insure a consistent enrollment procedure, each subject selected an arbitrary
four digit identification number, and then read these operating procedures:
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Using the hand reader is a simple matter of entering your ID number via the
keypad, placins your hand on the hand reader, ana observing the results.
Whenever the "READY lamp on the hand reader front panel is Hashing, it is
ready to accept an ID number. Once the ID number has been entered, it is
registered in the hand reader bv pressing the # key. Once a valid ID number has
been registered, the PLACE HAND lamp on the hand reader front panel will
light. Once this light comes on % the camera illumination lamp will come on , as
well as the four finger position indication lamps, and the hand should be placed
on the measuring platen. The hand is to remain held on the platen for a brief
moment until the PLACE HAND and camera lights go out. The results of the
verification attempt will then be indicated by the panel lights. (Users Manual,
1986, pp. 25-26)
To increase the probability of building an accurate reference template, each subject was
also given a copy of these correct hand placement rules (Users Manual, 1986. p. 26):
1) Bump the web between the middle and index finger up against the tall web
pin.
2) Close all fingers together so that they touch their respective placement guide
pins.
3) The balls of the finger tips should be against the platen surface, and the hand
should be as flat as Is comfortable.
4) If large rings are worn, care should be taken to see that the ring is rotated so
that the stone is up in the normal position.
The actual enrollment of each subject was done individually under complete
supervision. The supervisor set up the hand reader for the enrollment process using
the appropriate menu selections from the control program in the IBM computer. Each
subject was then given a practice ID number and allowed to operate the hand reader
five times to become familiar with the equipment and to practice hand placement. The
enrollee then accomplished five hand readings using his valid PIN. After these five
valid hand readings were completed, the display screen showed the results by printing
the five difference scores such as 16, 38, 12, 21, 9. These numbers represented the
differences between the template that had been formed by averaging all five pictures,
and each of the five individual hand readings. The supervisor then had the choice of
accepting, rejecting, or quitting the individual enrollment. If accepted, the user was
enrolled, and the reference template stored. If the session was quit, the user was not
enrolled. If rejection was chosen, the individual hand reading with the largest
difference was discarded and a new hand reading prompted for. All hand readings with
a score of 60 or less were accepted for this experiment. Also, the enrollees removed
their hands from the hand reader between each of the five enrollment readings. This
ensured a slightly different placement for each reading, and provided a wider range of
difference scores. Two test subjects were initially enrolled without removing their
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hands between the five enrollment readings. This resulted in difference scores of all Is.
This did not provide any variation to be averaged into the reference template. It was
as if one reading had been used to build the template. These two subjects were
reenrolled using the hand removal procedure.
3. Experiment Sessions
The experiment ran for a period of eight weeks immediately following the
enrollment of all 108 subjects. It was conducted in two parts. Part 1 covered the first
3 weeks. During this part, the subjects used the hand reader daily Monday through
Thursday of each week. Three identity verification attempts were made each day by
following the operating instructions read and discussed during enrollment. These
instructions were posted beside the hand reader for easy reference by the subjects. The
IBM computer recorded the difference score of each attempt, and also displayed
whether the subject had been identified. In addition to the difference score, which was
the result of comparing the new hand picture to the reference template, the computer
stored the complete hand picture with the time, date, and PIN for every hand reading.
All of this information for every access attempt, whether identification was verified or
not, was recorded and saved. Storage of this data permitted retrospective analysis of
which subjects would nave been correctly identified using different threshold settings.
This data also enabled reference templates to be built using various numbers of hand
pictures, and allowed the experiment to be re-run on these templates without requiring
additional hand readings from the test subjects.
Part 1 of the experiment was followed by a three week time lapse during which
the test subjects did not use the hand geometry device. Part 2 then began, and covered
a two week time period. During part 2, the test subjects made identity verification
attempts exactly as they had done in part 1. Three attempts were made each day
Monday through Thursday for two weeks. The only instructions given to the subjects
at the beginning of part 2 were simplified written instructions as shown in Figure 2.4.
As in part 1, the comparison difference scores as well as the complete hand picture,
time, date, and PIN were recorded so that retrospective analysis and experiment
reconstruction could be accomplished.
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OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS
1. IF WEARING RING, TURN STONE UP.
2. ENTER ID # (Eg. 1234#).
3. SPREAD FINGERS.
4. SLIDE HAND FORWARD UNTIL IT BUMPS
AGAINST WEB PCs'.
5. PRESS HAND FLAT AGAINST SURFACE.
6. CLOSE FEVGERS AGAEVST PINS.
7. HOLD UNTIL LAMP GOES OUT.
Figure 2.4 Part 2 Operating Instructions.
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III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The ID-3D Hand Geometry Identifier is one of many different types of biometric
access control devices now available. The suitability of this device for C3 applications
depends primarily on its Type I and Type II error rates, but is also a factor of other
measures of effectiveness such as time to achieve recognition, administration,
convenience to user, costs, and equipment reliability.
A. TYPE I AND TYPE II ERRORS
As mentioned in section II B, Type I errors are those which falsely reject an
authorized user, while Type II errors are those which falsely accept an unauthorized
user. These two types of errors must be considered together, and the results of
experiments determining these two types of errors can best be discussed by using error
curves (FIBS Pub 48, 1977). Error curves are really two curves in one. Figure 3.1 is a
plot of the error curves for the preferred performance of a biometric device. These
curves are preferred since they show results from a biometric identification device
which are as ideal as can be expected. This graph will be used to explain this system of
curves. The vertical scale is in units of percent of total access attempts. It is scaled
from 0% to. 9%. The horizontal scale is in units of the device's particular threshold
setting. For the ID-3D Identifier, the horizontal scale is in units of difference between
an individual hand reading and its corresponding reference template. This scale ranges
from to 150, and each interval is 20 units wide.
The Type I (false reject) error curve slopes downward to the right. It tells what
percent of the authorized user's hand readings would be rejected at a particular
threshold setting. For example, in Figure 3.1, if the threshold is set at 60, 4% of the
access attempts by authorized users would result in false rejects. This also means that
4% of the hand readings differed from their corresponding templates by more than a
difference of 60.
The second curve in Figure 3.1 is the Type II (false accept) error curve. It slopes
downward to the left, and shows what percent of the impostors would be falsely
accepted at a particular threshold setting. In this curve, again representing a preferred
performance, 0.7% of the impostors would be accepted at a threshold setting of 120.
This also means 0.7% of the impostors had a hand reading which differed from an
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Figure 3.1 Preferred Performance of Biometric Access Device.
The preferred performance curves of Figure 3.1 show that the Type I and Type II
error curves do not cross. This means that for a threshold setting anywhere between
95 and 105 no authorized users would be rejected, and no impostors would be
accepted. This is an ideal situation. Usually this situation cannot be obtained, and
error curves like those in Figure 3.2 are more realistic. This figure shows that the Type
1 and Type II error curves cross over. This means there is no threshold setting which
will eliminate both types of errors. In this situation,
if the threshold is set at the point where the two curves cross over, this is referred
to as the "equal error" setting. This is the point at which the Tvpe I and Tvpe II
error rates are equal, and the percentage of correct individuals being falselv
rejected will equal the percentage of impdsters being accepted. The erro~r at thfs
point is a single number which is to be used in describing the performance of
such devices. (TIBS Pub 83, 19S0, pp. 17)
In Figure 3.2, the equal error rate exists at a threshold setting of 90, and the equal
error point is 1%. This means 1% of the authorized users will be rejected, and at the
same time, 1% of the imposters will be accepted with the threshold setting at this equal
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error point. This single number, the equal error point, describes the performance of a
biometric device. Settings above and below will favor one error rate at the expense of
the other. Error curves like those in Figure 3.2 will be used to examine the various
Type I and Type II errors which resulted from different threshold settings, a time lapse
in use by the test subjects, and construction of the reference templates from different
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Figure 3.2 Realistic Error Curves For Biometric Access Devices.
1. Different Threshold Settings
The major factor in determining the reliability of a biometric access control
device is its Type I and Type II errors at various threshold settings. In this ID-3D
Identifier experiment, the Type I errors for the entire range of threshold settings from
to 150 were obtained. The actual threshold setting for this experiment was always 100,
but this setting was not significant since the difference scores of all hand readings were
recorded. The percentage of these recorded differences above a particular threshold
provided the Type I errors for that threshold. Operationally, the threshold setting can
be adjusted by the system operator. This is done through a menu formatted control
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program in the enrollment terminal. The operator selects 'diagnostics and setup' from
the main menu, and then selects 'change setup values' from the diagnostic menu. The
new threshold value is then prompted for. Once the threshold setting is entered, it is
automatically transmitted to the hand reader.
The Type II errors were able to be obtained through a comparison process
since all of the reference templates were stored. To do this, the hand reader test system
was configured so that each individual reference template could be used as a single
hand reading. Each individual reference template, as a single hand reading, was
compared to each of the other templates as if it was an access attempt using the PIN
of the other templates. A difference score for each comparison was obtained, and any
difference below that of a particular threshold constituted a Type II error for that
threshold. The entire range of threshold settings from to 150 was again considered.
This method of obtaining Type II errors provided results as accurate as if each subject
used the PIN of all other enrollees to make access attempts, and was much more
timely.
The total number of Type I and Type II errors for all hand readings for the
entire experiment are plotted in Figure 3.3. These errors, calculated from all readings
for the entire experiment, are also summarized in Table 1. Figure 3.3 and Table 1
show that the threshold setting which produced equal Type I and Type II errors was
100. The error rate at this equal error point was 0.62%. These error curves also show
there is a trade off between Type I and Type II errors. If a very low Type I error rate
is required, then a threshold setting must be used which gives a higher Type II error
rate. Also, the Type I error curve never goes to 0.0%. This is due to the fact that one
mistake by a subject in accomplishing a hand reading will give a difference score of
400. This large score will be a Type I error and will always be considered in
determining the error percentage. A strategy for dealing with this situation is discussed
in section III, A, 5. The Type II error curve does go to 0.0%, but at a threshold
setting which gives a very large Type I error rate. In figure 3.3 a threshold setting of
50 eliminates all Type II errors but allows a 7.0% Type I errors. If an operational
situation requires security measures to prevent the false acceptance of all unauthorized
users, many authorized users would be falsely rejected. This would be inconvenient,
and procedures to deal with this situation would have to be developed.
A number of factors influenced the percentages of Type I errors. First, a































IS. 1 1 „ "
"





20 40 60 80 100
THRESHOLD
120 140
Figure 3.3 ID-3D Identifier Test Results.
TABLE 1






















rings presented a problem since the ring often rotated towards the little finger. The
ring's stone then formed a false web between the ring and little finger. This resulted in
large dimensional measurement errors and inflated difference scores. Subjects who saw
these large difference scores on initial readings were able to correct the problem in later
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readings by rotating the ring's stone upwards before taking the hand readings. This
alleviated the problem.
A second factor which caused variation in the hand readings and large
difference scores was frequent 'playing' with the system by the test subjects. Since use
of the hand reader was totally unsupervised, subjects often experimented on their own.
They tried other subjects PINs, used incorrect hand positions, moved their hand during
the reading, and placed foreign objects on the measuring platen along with their hand.
This 'playing' with the system was easily detected, but did cause inflated difference
scores, and would not occur in an operational setting where identification is required to
gain access.
A third factor was the prevalence of hand readings where there was a
significant rotation of the hand on the measuring platen. This happened because the
hand reader occasionally moved to squarely face the subject and became centered on
his body. This forced the wrist to be cocked at an angle, and encouraged hand
rotation. All subjects were seated while making hand readings, and the location of the
chair may have contributed to this problem. In an operational situation, users would
use the hand reader while standing to eliminate this problem.
One factor which shifted the Type II error curve to the left, that is caused a
higher rate of errors at all threshold settings, is the narrow range of hands in the test
population. The Naval Postgraduate School subjects, coming from a narrow age
group, being predominately male, and having very similar vocational backgrounds,
were less diverse than a normal test or operational field would be. This caused lower
difference scores when comparing one reference template to all other templates to
determine Type II errors.
2. Time Lapse
A second factor in determining the reliability of a biometric access device is
the changes in error rates after a time lapse during which the device is not used. This
is especially important in a device that measures an attribute which is subject to
change. To examine this factor, a time lapse of three weeks occurred between parts 1
and 2 of this experiment. Type I and Type II error rate curves for each part were then
calculated separately. Error curves for part 1 are in Figure 3.4. Error curves for part 2
are in Figure 3.5. The equal error point for Type I and Type II errors during part 1
was at a threshold difference of 98 with errors of 0.52%. The equal error point during
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Figure 3.4 Type I and Type II Errors During Part I.
The number of Type II errors could not be recalculated for part 2 since Type
II errors were determined from the reference templates made during enrollment. Those
reference templates were not rcaccomplished during part 2. Therefore, the Type II
error curves for both parts 1 and 2 in Figures 3.4 and 3.5 are identical.
A comparison of the Type I errors for parts 1 and 2 of the experiment is in
Table 2. This comparison shows that the percentage of Type I errors at each threshold
setting increased after the three week time lapse during which the test subjects did not
use the device. Two factors must be considered in accounting for this change. First,
the learning curve came into play after resuming use of the hand reader. As part 2
began, test subjects were given only limited written instructions to remind them of the
necessary procedures. Certain subjects took a number of access attempts to reacquaint
themselves with the necessary techniques to use the hand reader. This caused an
increase in the difference scores, and thus an increase in Type I errors. A second factor
affecting the Type I error rates was changes in the subjects hands. In two cases, hand
injuries had occurred which caused significant changes in the hand's geometry. In
other cases, different rings were being worn which also affected the hand readings and
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Figure 3.5 Type I and Type II Errors During Part 2.
increased the difference scores. The effect of these factors could have been overcome
by providing more explicit instructions and reenrolling select individuals at the start of
part 2.
TABLE 2
TYPE I AND TYPE II ERRORS FOR PARTS 1 AND 2
Threshold Part 1 Part 2





















In normal use of the ID-3D Identifier, a reference template is constructed by
averaging five individual hand readings. That is what was done during the enrollment
process of this experiment. Those reference templates, made from five hand readings,
were then used to determine all of the Type I and Type II errors which have been
discussed to this point. However, it is possible to make reference templates from any
number of hand readings. Since all of the dimensional data from every hand reading
was recorded in this experiment, templates were later constructed from 1, 2, 4, 5, 6. 8,
and 10 hand readings. The entire experiment was then rerun against each of these
newly constructed reference templates. The results provided threshold settings and
rates for equal errors while using each of these new templates. These results are shown
in Table 3.
TABLE 3
CHANGES IN TEMPLATE CONSTRUCTION
Readings Per Equal Error Equal Error
Template Threshold Rate
1 112 0.85%
2 105 0. 73%
4 104 0. 63%
5 . 100 0. 62%
6 100 0. 61%
8 99 0. 58%
10 99 0.56%
The data in Table 3 shows that a template made from 4 to 6 readings is a
good compromise between convenience and performance. One or two readings do not
provide enough variation to form a suitable template. Using up to 10 readings
continues to increase performance, but not at a rate great enough to offset the
additional time required to make such a template.
4. Updating Algorithm
The performance of a biometric identity verifier is dependent upon the quality
of the template created during the enrollment process (Stein, 1985). This is the time
when the user is most unfamiliar with the verifier, and is apt to be nervous and tense.
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Consequently, the template is not as likely to accurately represent the users biometric
characteristics, as compared to the accuracy of measurements taken after the device
has become familiar and a habitual pattern of use developed. Also, there may be some
long term changes in the biometric attribute which would cause a loss in performance
of the device over a period of time.
In order to accommodate these possibilities and thereby improve performance,
the makers of the ID-3D Identifier developed a reference template updating algorithm
for their device during this experiment. This algorithm adjusts the template after each
successful verification to accommodate changes in the measured hand. This new
algorithm was installed in the Test System, an initial reference template made from the
first 5 hand readings, and the experiment rerun. This was possible because all of the
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Figure 3.6 Test Results With Updating Algorithm.
The information in Figure 3.6 is directly comparable to that in Figure 3.3 as
the identical data set was used. This data includes all hand readings for the entire
experiment. Use of the updating algorithm reduced the equal error rate from 0.62% to
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0.40%. Similar results can be seen by looking separately at each part of the
experiment. With the updating algorithm, the equal error rate for part 1 dropped from
0.52% to 0.31%. For part 2, the drop was from 0.75% to 0.51%.
With the updating algorithm, the number of hand readings used to make the
initial reference template is of little importance over the long run. When initial
templates were made from 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 readings, and the data from the entire
experiment rerun using the updating algorithm, equal error rates of 0.39%, 0.41%,
0.38%, 0.40%, 0.39%, 0.37%, and 0.38% were obtained. There was little change in
these equal error rates since all errors in the template were overcome by the updating
algorithm. With this new algorithm, initial reference templates can be made from one
hand reading.
5. The Three Try Strategy
Operational identity verifiers are frequently programmed so that no penalty is
invoked until after three consecutive rejects (Maxwell, undated). This allows a careless
user a second and third try to be correctly identified. All of the experiment results
reported so far have been based on a single try basis. However, each subject did make
three hand readings at each daily measurement session. The recording of each of these
readings allowed retrospective determination of error rates in the case of a three try
strategy.
The consequences of a three try strategy were examined for threshold settings
of 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100. To do this, all hand readings with a difference of less
than 50 were first removed. Next, any session which now contained less than three
trials was removed. This was able to be done because, if one trial in a session had a
difference below 50, that session would have been successful at a threshold setting of
50. What remained was records for all sessions in which all three readings for a session
were greater that 50. For each of these groups of three readings, the minimum
difference was then noted. If the decision threshold had been set below this minimum,
then all three tries, and thus the group, would have been rejected. The group would
then be classified as a false reject (Type I error). This procedure was done for both the
case of template updating and fixed template operation, and the results are in Table 4.
In Table 4, the Number row shows the number of three try groups whose
lowest difference score was in the difference range for that column. The Number Above
row shows the total number of groups that were above the minimum value of the
range for that column. This Number Above row shows the number of groups of false
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rejects that would result from using a three try strategy at a threshold set at the
minimum of that column. There were 2100 three try trials by authorized users in the
test. By dividing the Number Above row by 2100, the percent of Type I errors can be
found. This percentage is listed in the Type I row. The Type II row indicates the Type
II error rate corresponding to a difference threshold equal to the minimum range of the
column. These Type II error rates were read directly from Figure 3.3 for the
algorithm that did not update, and from Figure 3.6 for the algorithm which did.
The three try strategy improved the identity verification performance
characteristics. Without template updating the equal error rate dropped from 0.62% to
0.36%, and with template updating it dropped from 0.40% to 0.33% using three tries
instead of one. These improvements occurred because the false rejections due to
incorrect placement of the hand on the platen or other test subjest mistakes were
eliminated. No adjustment was made in the Type II error curves to allow for a three
try strategy. This is because the difference between the template and the imposter
hand reading was so great there was no chance a second or third attempt would be
successful. Each Type II error from a single try would also result in an error on the
second and third try. Therefore, the number of single try errors based on all attempts
would yield the same percentage as all group errors based on the total number of three
try groups. The three try Type II curve would therefore be the same as the single try
curve.
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6. Biometric Device Comparison
In addition to hand geometry, five other human biometric features or actions
have been used to develop identity verification devices. They include eye retinal
pattern, fingerprint, signature dynamics, and voiceprint. These devices have been
under development for about ten years, and were tested by the Sandia National
Laboratory, New Mexico in April-June 1985 (Maxwell, undated). This was a
laboratory type operational evaluation using 40 Sandia employees making two entry
attempts a day for 60 days. This test was totally supervised, with the supervisor
present every time a subject made an access attempt. False rejects (Type I errors) were
obtained using the threshold settings suggested by the manufacture. False acceptance
(Type II errors) were obtained by having each subject key in the PINs of all other
enrollees, and presenting the appropriate feature or performance sample for
verification. The results from the eye retinal pattern device were the most favorable.
A 12.4% Type I error occurred, but 0.0% Type II errors existed. For the fingerprint
device, 19.7% Type I and 10.5% Type II errors were recorded. For the signature
dynamics machine, 15.1% Type I and 5.8% Type II errors were obtained. The
voiceprint device recorded 9.5% Type I errors, and 17.7% Type II errors. These rates
all pertain to single try attempts, and the results could be substantially different under
different environments and using different procedures. The ID-3D Identifier performed
better than all of these devices except for the Type II error testing of the retinal eye
pattern machine.
B. OTHER MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
A number of measures of effectiveness in addition to Type I and Type II errors
must be examined to determine the suitability of the ID-3D Hand Geometry Identifier.
These include time to achieve recognition, administration, convenience to user, costs,
and equipment reliability.
1. Time to Achieve Recognition
The time to achieve recognition is made up of the time required to activate the
hand reader, acquire the actual hand reading, retrieve the template, complete the
correlation process, and effect acceptance or rejection. These times are important
when considering access control to C3 facilities, and could become critical when a
number of users must gain access when time is limited. The total time to attempt
recognition for each access trial in this experiment was less than 3 seconds. This time
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was the same whether identification was verified or not. Of course, if identification was
not verified, additional trials would be required which would double or triple the 3
second time requirement. Throughput of persons using the ID-3D Identifier was
typically 7 persons per minute for this experiment.
2. Administration
High level security systems in use today can require a great deal of
administration. Much of this administration is in controlling and changing the
entrance artifacts, whether they be keys, passwords, or combination locks. There are
numerous precautions which must be taken when passwords and key-cards are utilized
under the guidelines of the National Computer Security Center (DODCSC, 1985).
Most of this administration could be alleviated through the use of a hand geometry
biometric access control device. With this device, the administration would primarily
be encompassed in user enrollment. The enrollment time for subjects in this test took
less that 4 minutes per subject.
3. Convenience to User
For a personal identification system to gain acceptance, it must be reasonably
convenient. Otherwise, it could be regarded as an impediment and may even be
circumvented. Convenience also includes how easy it is to learn to use the system.
The ID-3D Identifier is very user friendly. It uses a totally noninvasive measuring
device which was quickly accepted by all test subjects. A small degree of cooperation
was required, but persons of every background quickly learned to use the system. Two
subjects did have some difficulty being recognized on their first attempts a number of
days. This difficulty can most likely be attributed to the enrollment. If these
individuals had been reenrolled after they had become familiar with the equipment,
their difficulties would have been eliminated.
4. Costs
The ID-3D Identifier can be used as a self-contained device. It can also be
part of an integrated system requiring support functions from a central computer. As
a stand alone device, the ID-3D Identifier costs S3,500. This includes the hand reader,
the enrollment terminal, and a tape recorder to store the reference templates. This cost
is on the low end of a S2,000 to SI 2,000 price range of per terminal costs for various
types of biometric devices (Bakke, 1986).
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5. Equipment Reliability
Reliability can be defined as the probability that the device will perform its
intended function over a specified period of time. As applied to equipment
performance, reliability refers to the ability to continue operating at the desired level of
effectiveness without drifting out of tolerance or breaking down. There was no
evidence that either of these faults occurred in the ID-3D Identifier during this test.
The equipment functioned as required throughout the five weeks of the experiment.
The only operator assistance required came after a power failure. When this happened,
the hand reader's programmable memory lost the reference templates. These templates
had to be reloaded from the Test System computer, just as they would have to be
reloaded from a tape recorder in actual operation. This procedure takes less than 10
seconds to accomplish. The ID-3D Identifier is designed so that it is fail-safe. That is,
it denies access if a failure occurs or the power is shut off. Also, it has built in
detectors which warn against any tampering. The ID-3D Identifier will allow for
multiple identification attempts as may be needed in the three try strategy, but this
number is limited to thwart an imposter who might try to gain access by trial and
error.
C. C3 APPLICATIONS
Command, Control, and Communications (C3) and its numerous sister terms,
Command and Control (C2), Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
(C3I), and Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) are all
somewhat ambiguous. In fact, they can all mean almost anything from military
computers to the art of generalship, whatever the user wishes them to mean (Moll,
1978). A good place to start in defining these terms is the official Department of
Defense definition for Command and Control.
A Command and Control system consists of an arrangement of personnel,
equipment, facilities, communications and procedures that are employed by a
commander in planning
,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (J OPS, Vol I, 1976, pp.6)
C2, and therefore C3, consists of the physical entities of facilities, equipment, and
communications. These physical entities must be protected at all times, and the
ultimate authority for granting access to sensitive information and facilities rests with
the commanding officer (OPNAVINST 5510.1G, 1984). Physical security is the most
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important countermeasure to penetration, so access to facilities, equipment, and
communications must be tightly controlled (SECNAVINST 5500.31A, 1985).
Access to C3 facilities and systems is presently controlled by security guards,
keys, passwords, badges, or key-cards. Technology exists to augment these methods
with biometric access devices. If properly used, biometric access devices can ensure
positive identification with a high level of confidence, provide an accurate audit of a
facilities use, and significantly reduce the administrative burden associated with
protecting C3 systems.
The level of security required at a particular facility varies because of the nature
of the facility, and the type of threat against it (Barker, 1984). However, positive
identification of people using sensitive facilities is always required, and biometric access
control devices can meet that need. These devices are not perfect, as this hand
geometry test points out, but they eliminate the vulnerabilities of being lost, stolen, or
duplicated. Also, the threshold settings on the biometric devices can be set to provide
the desired level of security. In using these biometric devices, there is always the trade
off of increasing one type of error in order to reduce the other type. If a facility must
be protected to the extent that no impostors can be allowed, that is no Type II errors,
then the device's threshold setting must be low. This would increase the number of
false rejects, Type I errors, and this inconvenience would have to be accepted.
Conversly, if the level of security was such that the risk of accepting an impostor was
low, but no authorized users could be rejected, the threshold could be moved to a high
setting. This decision would have to be made at each facility by the commander upon
recommendation of the security officer. The ID-3D Identifier has the capabilities to
meet the requirements, regardless of the results of this decision, by using a three try
strategy and an updating algorithm.
The US Air Force has been directed as the lead agency to develop equipment to
automate physical security access control (DOD Directive 3224.3, 1984). As such, they
have provided guidelines as to the capabilities of automated systems. Their guidelines
provide performance standards for all advanced entry control systems. These standards
state that a goal of 0.0% of both Type I and Type II errors should be sought, but that
the minimum requirement for Type I errors is 3.0% and for Type II errors is 1.0%
(OCSE, 1984). These are only minimums since the final decision of how stringent the
access control must be remains with each individual commander. The ID-3D Identifier
exceeded these minimums in every configuration examined in this test. It is a valid
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device for use in ensuring positive identification in C3 applications. This technology is
a secure way to replace the existing means to gain access and to verify individual
identity. If the risk of unauthorized access is high, as it is in C3 applications, a hand
geometry biometric device can be installed to replace key-cards, identification badges,
and passwords. At command posts, an ID-3D Identifier could be used to ensure only
those persons appropriately cleared be allowed to enter. At communication facilities,
the device could verify the identity of all who receipt for messages. At terminals tied to
the local area network of a command staff, the ID-3D Identifier could ensure only
those authorized to use the network gained access.
Access control should include provisions for the logging of access to a facility in
order to provide a record of who used the facility and what information was accessed
(FIBS Pub 48, 1977). For C3 facilities, information would be very useful in
discovering, tracing, and preventing intrusions. If a security violation were discovered
at a C3 facility, a log of who used the facility at what times would be very helpful in
determining the cause of the violation and the extent of the resulting damages.
Presently an audit trail of facility use is seldom accomplished at C3 facilities. If a log is
kept, it is done manually at great expense in time and personnel. If set so as to detect
all unauthorized users, biometric access control devices can automatically provide a
complete list of who used a facility and what information they accessed. The ID-3D
Identifier has the capability of printing this log either locally or remotely, and can also
provide a complete record of usage in a system computer (Users Manual, 1986). This
audit providing capability of the ID-3D Identifier makes it very suitable for C3
applications.
C3 facilities are continually employing increasing numbers of computer systems
to assist military commanders fulfill their missions. Access to these computer systems
is presently accomplished by using passwords. Since passwords can be easily
compromised, their use is very vulnerable. Also, passwords require a great deal of
administrative effort. In fact a lengthy guideline has been published which outlines all
of the steps that must be taken to correctly use passwords in granting acess to
classified information (DODCSC STD 002-85, 1985). The steps in this guide are very
manpower intensive, and yet do not eliminate all of the vulnerabilities. An ID-3D
Identifier can provide the positive identification required to check clearances and grant
access to computer systems. This automatic device is very suited to accomplishing
these tasks as a stand alone device or when connected to a host computer. The ID-3D
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Identifier is well suited to replacing passwords and their lengthy administrative
requirements.
With the increased use of computers in C3 tasks, a corresponding increase in the
use of databases has resulted. These databases contain large amounts of data from
which processors draw to aid commanders make informed decisions. They must be
protected from unauthorized reading and unauthorized manipulation. Also, these
databases often store information in several classification levels to economize on space
and to increase convenience. This information is divided into segments and each
segment contains a different type of information accessible by a specific group of
people. This requires that a person accessing a segment of a database be in fact the
person who he says he is, and also be authorized to use that segment. Positive
identification with little administrative involvement is required. This can be done by
replacing passwords which are presently used to access database segments with hand
geometry biometric devices. These devices can be sequentially used to identify and
grant access to various segments of a database. With this approach to positive
identification, there are no passwords to be compromised and an audit trail is available
to identify who accessed what information at what time.
Hand Geometry identification techniques are very applicable in protecting C3
facilities and systems. Positive identification can be ensured with a high degree of
confidence so that access control can be automated. A complete audit trail can be
provided which acts as a deterrent to intruders and aids in the investigation if a
violation occurs. A significant reduction in the administration of the security aspects
of C3 systems would occur if passwords were replaced. C3 facilities must be protected
from unauthorized use, and hand geometry access devices can accomplish this priority
task.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The ID-3D Hand Geometry Identifier proved to be an effective biometric identity
verification device for a number of specific requirements. This experiment
demonstrated that the ID-3D Identifier can maintain a false rejection of authorized
users {Type I) error rate of 0.2%, and at the same time a false acceptance of impostors
(Type II) error rate of 0.4%. These results were realized at a threshold setting of 80
using the three try strategy and the reference template updating algorithm. The three
try strategy with reference template updating is how the ID-3D Identifier should be
used since that is how the best results are obtained. However, a single try strategy
with an algorithm which did not update also produced an equal Type I and Type II
error rate of 0.62%, which is better than the minimum requirement. A period of time
when subjects did not use the device increased the equal error rate only slightly from
0.52% to 0.75%. If the updating algorithm was used both before and after this time
lapse, the increase was from 0.31% to 0.40%. Constructing reference templates from
different numbers of hand readings had little effect while using the updating algorithm.
With the nonupdating algorithm, five hand readings is the most logical number to use
in making the reference template.
The ID-3D Identifier performed as advertised during this experiment. It
exceeded the published and previously tested equal error rate of 0.5% while employing
a three try strategy using the updating algorithm. It is also a fast, noninvasive, user
friendly identification device. It is of low cost and very equipment reliable. It is a
device worthy of consideration for automating access control techniques.
Security requirements have dictated the necessity to upgrade and automate the
access control requirements at C3 facilities. There are inherent vulnerabilities in using
todays keys, badges, passwords, and key-cards. Hand geometry devices like the ID-3D
Identifier have the capabilities to reduce these vulnerabilities. They can ensure positive
identification with a high level of confidence, significantly reduce the security
administrative burden, and provide an accurate audit trail of facility use. The decision
whether or not to use a biometric access control device must remain with individuals
at each C3 facility, based on their need, but the ID-3D Identifier exceeds the minimum
requirements, and so represents a possible solution.
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There are some areas of study which should be accomplished to further verify the
capabilities of the ID-3D Identifier. First, the magnitude of the learning curve
associated with using the ID-3D Identifier should be determined, as well as how to best
employ this information. Second, an operational test should be conducted and the
operational performance compared to these experiment results. Third, the Type I and
Type II errors when the number of reference templates in memory approaches the
maximum of 10,000 vice the 108 in this experiment should be tested. Fourth, a cost
benefit analysis should be accomplished at a variety of C3 facilities to determine what
savings would result from using an ID-3D Identifier for access control.
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